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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is currently conducting an ambitious strategic review, 
prompted by a perception that the institution has become less relevant in the international 
arena. The current levels of Fund lending, which are at all-time lows, have been interpreted as 
a manifestation of this situation. Apart from the current absence of crises in emerging coun-
tries, some members have repaid loans early and the possibility of resorting to alternative in-
surance mechanisms that may displace IMF lending, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative, is in-
creasingly being considered. The paltry levels of fi nancing granted are, moreover, insuffi cient 
to enable the IMF to cover its operating costs, since the revenues of the institution depend 
almost entirely on its volume of lending. The IMF is considering alternative sources of fi nancing 
to break this strong link between lending and revenues.
In recent years, the IMF has made a signifi cant effort to adapt to a continuously evolving inter-
national economy, but the changes made have not been suffi cient. Certain aspects of the in-
stitution still need reviewing, such as its role in the surveillance area, the best way of respond-
ing to the needs of its members, especially the emerging economies and low-income countries, 
and how to improve countries’ representation in its decision-making bodies. These are all 
priority reforms and constitute the main objective of the strategic review currently under way. 
Along with the search for a fi nancing model that is not so dependent on credit, the strategic 
review offers an excellent opportunity to re-examine the IMF’s lending activity, and that is the 
aim of this article.
Study of the IMF’s lending apparatus and its use during the present and the last decade pro-
vides arguments for the introduction of a number of improvements. The current range of fi nan-
cial facilities is not the result of systematic planning, but of a process of adaptation to the dif-
ferent types of balance of payments need and crisis that have arisen during the IMF’s existence. 
The introduction of new lines in response to new fi nancial challenges has given rise to a prolif-
eration of instruments that appears to be excessive. Indeed, some of these facilities have been 
used only temporarily and others have never actually been used at all. 
The IMF has successively eliminated the most obsolete instruments, but there is still room to 
simplify the current lending mechanism. At the same time it could also be made more fl exible, to 
enable the adaptation to possible crises to be more rapid and effective, and its incentive structure 
could be improved, to ensure that countries make the best possible use of the institution’s re-
sources. This would involve precise adjustment of the volume and duration of credits, with the 
twofold aim of preserving resources and increasing their availability to members. With these con-
siderations in mind, this article refl ects upon the possibility of replacing the IMF’s current credit 
lines by a single one that would incorporate the improvements mentioned above, while also 
eliminating the risk of arbitrage across instruments, for which the Fund has been criticised. 
In order to develop these issues, this article begins by analysing the IMF’s present lending 
mechanism and its use over the period 1990-2006. It goes on to explore the advantages of 
merging all the ordinary credit lines into a single credit line or fi nancial facility and then considers 
the main features that such a mechanism should incorporate, its impact and its interaction with 
other elements of the IMF’s lending framework. The article ends by drawing some conclusions. 
Introduction
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IMF fi nancing is designed to cover the temporary balance of payments needs of member 
countries, when they are unable to obtain in the market, on accessible terms, suffi cient funds 
to make their international payments. This fi nancial assistance may be accessed through three 
channels which share the common purpose of transferring reserve currencies to the countries: 
regular operations, allocations of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and concessional operations. 
This article focuses solely on regular operations, which are the cornerstone of the IMF’s lend-
ing activity. These operations are fi nanced with funds from the General Resources Account 
(GRA), the backbone of the IMF’s fi nancial structure, made up of members’ contributions in the 
form of quotas.
IMF lending takes place through a mechanism of currency purchases and repurchases, equiv-
alent to the disbursements and repayments of a conventional loan. When fi nancing is granted 
to a country, the latter purchases SDRs or some other strong currency from the IMF, in ex-
change for the equivalent amount of its own currency. Subsequently, to repay this fi nancing, 
the country repurchases its own currency using SDRs or some other strong currency. It should 
be noted that, strictly speaking, credit only exists when the member country’s purchases ex-
ceed the whole of its quota, since until then it is merely making use of its contribution to the 
institution.
The credit granting process is based on an arrangement which stipulates, on the one hand, 
the specifi c policies and measures that the country commits to implement to resolve its bal-
ance of payments problem and, on the other hand, the amounts that the IMF shall make avail-
able through its facilities. The IMF will previously have assessed the situation of the borrower 
country, whether recourse to its funds is justifi ed and whether there are suffi cient guarantees 
that these funds will be returned. The IMF will also estimate the borrower’s fi nancing needs and 
the volume and maturities it is able to assume, taking into account the internal adjustment it 
will necessarily have to make and the private sector’s participation in the coverage of these 
needs. On this basis, the country negotiates an economic programme with the IMF which it 
presents in a Letter of Intent to its Executive Board. Once the arrangement has been ap-
proved, the credit will be made available in the form of periodic disbursements conditional 
upon implementation of the successive phases of the programme or, in IMF terminology, upon 
compliance with the conditionality.
The IMF has a number of fi nancial facilities or credit lines, to respond to the various needs of 
its members arising from various types of crisis:
— Stand-by Arrangements (SBA). These are designed to help countries to address 
short-term balance of payments problems and, as we shall see below, channel 
most of the resources lent by the IMF. 
— Extended Fund Facility (EFF). This facility basically works in the same way as the 
SBA, but its objective is to help to address longer-term balance of payments 
problems requiring reforms of a more structural nature. 
— Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF). This credit line is designed for countries suf-
fering exceptional balance of payments diffi culties, which need short-term fi nanc-
ing on a large scale, as a result of a sudden and disruptive loss of confi dence in 
the markets. Access to the SRF is not subject to the ordinary access limits, al-
though it is subject to the exceptional access framework (defi ned below), and 
depends on the country’s fi nancing needs, its repayment capacity, the soundness 
of its programme and its economic and fi nancial record.
The IMF’s lending 
framework and its 
evolution
CURRENT LENDING FRAMEWORK
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— Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF). This facility is used to assist countries 
experiencing either a sudden shortfall in export earnings or an increase in the cost 
of cereal imports, as a result of world commodity price fl uctuations. The reason 
for the application for this facility must be short-term and beyond the member 
country’s control.
— Emergency Assistance Facility (EAF). This credit line is granted to support the re-
covery of countries following a natural disaster or armed confl ict, sometimes at 
subsidised interest rates. A special feature is that it is backed up not by condi-
tionality, but by economic policy advice and Technical Assistance.
Table 1 shows the main features of these fi ve facilities. The volume of fi nancing that a country 
can obtain, i.e. its access limit, varies according to the type of loan and is expressed as a 
multiple of its IMF quota. All facilities are subject to what is known as the rate of charge, which 
is the SDR interest rate plus a profi t margin and a further mark-up for specifi c reserves. The 
SDR rate is a market rate, which is calculated weekly as the weighted average of the short-
term interest rates of the money markets of the currencies that make up the SDR valuation 
basket (US dollar, euro, Japanese yen and pound sterling). In addition to the rate of charge, 
the IMF charges premiums or surcharges, based on the volume drawn down or the time 
elapsed, depending on the type of facility. 
As Table 1 shows, three facilities (SBA, EFF and CFF) have a volume surcharge, and only in 
one case (SRF) does the cost increase with the length of the programme. Also, the arrange-
ment and repayment periods vary according to the facility used. The latter are divided into 
compulsory periods and expected periods, a distinction introduced by the IMF to provide in-
centives for a limited use of its resources over time.
In addition to these credit lines, the framework regulating the IMF’s lending activity consists of 
policies or rules which establish how access to fi nancing may be obtained in particular circum-
stances. The main ones are the exceptional access framework and the Lending into Arrears 
(LIA) policy. The former dictates the conditions that must be fulfi lled for a country to be able to 
gain access to larger volumes of credit than those detailed in Table 1, while the latter stipulates 
the circumstances that should exist and the measures that a country must take to have access 
to IMF lending when it is in arrears to its private creditors.
Periods (months)
Expected Compulsory
SBA
100% per annum
300% in total
100 if 200%Q < V < 300%Q
200 if V > 300%Q
12-18 (max.36) 27-48 39-60
EFF
100% per annum
300% in total
100 if 200%Q < V < 300%Q
200 if V > 300%Q
36 (max. 48) 54-84 54-120
SRF Unlimited**
300 the first year
50 extra each 6m, max. 500
max. 12 24-30 27-36
CFF 10-55%
100 if 200%Q < V < 300%Q
200 if V > 300%Q
— 27-48 39-60
06-93———%05-52FAE
Facility
Access limits
(% quota)
Surcharges*
(basis points)
Repayment
Arrangement
MAIN FEATURES OF THE GRA FACILITIES TABLE 1
* Q: quota; V: volume drawn down. ** Subject to compliance with the exceptional access framework criteria.
Memorandum item: service charge of 50 basis points.
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During the period 1990-2006 the IMF fi nanced 290 programmes in favour of 90 countries1. 
This is the most representative period of Fund lending, since it ranges from short- and medi-
um-term current account imbalances, the Fund’s traditional activity, to the so-called 21st cen-
tury crises (Mexico 95, south-east Asia 97, Russia and Brazil 98, Turkey and Argentina 01 and 
Uruguay 02), and also includes the fi nancing granted to economies in transition from a planned 
to a market model in the fi rst half of the 1990s.
The left-hand panel of Chart 1 shows the distribution of facilities granted by number. The fi rst 
conclusion to be drawn is the predominance of SBA arrangements. Also striking is the fact 
that SBA and EFF programmes together account for more than 75% of the total. Even more 
revealing is the analysis of the volumes actually drawn down under these programmes, which 
are shown in the right-hand panel. These volumes could be interpreted as being the amounts 
that the countries really needed to cover their fi nancing shortfalls after exhausting market 
channels, internal adjustment and private-sector involvement. 
The main difference between these two panels is that the analysis of the volume of credit 
shows the true weight of the SRF facility, since its creation in 1997, and the residual use of the 
EAF and CFF. Also, comparison of the two panels shows the intense use, in volume terms, of 
the SRF, i.e. the large amounts drawn down under this facility in a very small number of pro-
grammes (eight in all). 
The distribution of the volume of fi nancing drawn down by line also shows that practically all 
the institution’s lending (97.2%) is concentrated in three lines: SBA, EFF and SRF. This high 
degree of concentration, the great similarity between the SBA, EFF, CFF and EAF facilities 
(especially the fi rst two, which only differ in terms of their duration and the type of conditional-
ity associated with them), and the fact that the SRF line is always granted in conjunction with 
another one (normally an SBA or, very rarely, an EFF) are arguments for a possible reduction in 
the number of available facilities. 
LENDING DEVELOPMENTS
1. The following analysis does not consider the use of credit lines that were eliminated during the reference period. Their 
inclusion would have strengthened the argument that the number of facilities is excessive when compared to their ac-
tual use, but for the purposes of this article it was considered more rigorous to base the analysis on the current catalogue 
of facilities. 
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The concentration of lending in these facilities has been constant over the years. Chart 2 
shows the volume of credit approved and its percentage distribution among the various facili-
ties during the period of study. The use of SBA arrangements has shown a marked preponder-
ance, shared fi rstly with the EFF facility (1991-98), and subsequently with the SRF facility 
(1997-02). It should also be noted that the correspondence between lines and objectives has 
not always been clear. Although each facility is designed, in principle, to resolve a specifi c bal-
ance of payments need, in practice their granting has not faithfully refl ected such needs, giving 
rise to arbitrage across facilities.
Analysis of the current lending framework and how it has been used suggests two possible 
areas for improvement. First, there are arguments to support the view that it might be possible 
to simplify the IMF’s catalogue of facilities and to make it more fl exible, without any loss of 
usefulness to its members. Second, its incentive structure could be strengthened, to ensure 
that the use of the IMF’s resources is in line with the actual needs of the country in diffi culty, 
given their scarcity and the need for them to be available to all members. In accordance with 
this approach, this section raises the possibility of replacing the current credit lines with a sin-
gle facility, fl exible enough to meet the different demands of the borrower countries. This facil-
ity would have a cost structure that rises with the volume and duration of the credit, and peri-
ods that are better aligned with borrowers’ needs. 
As already mentioned, the current SBA and EFF facilities have a stepped cost profi le, rising 
with the volume of fi nancing granted, irrespective of the duration of the programme. The op-
posite is true for the SRF facility, the cost of which rises as its duration lengthens, irrespective 
of the amount of the fi nancing (see Figure 1).
Combining these two criteria, the cost of a hypothetical single facility would be determined by 
two variables. The cost-setting system would be based on the IMF’s current rate of charge (rc), 
adding extra basis points (ebp) as the volume (V) – in terms of the quota – and the duration (t) 
of the fi nancing increase. To achieve the objectives mentioned above, this system would offer 
cheaper loans for those volume and duration tranches considered appropriate3 while, at the 
same time, making fi nancing above certain thresholds more expensive.
Would one single facility 
be suffi cient?2
COST STRUCTURE
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DISTRIBUTION OF FACILITY USE OVER TIME CHART 2
SOURCES: IMF and Banco de España.
2. The forthcoming Banco de España Occasional Paper Streamlining the IMF Lending Mechanism. Why not a Single 
Financial Facility? contains an in-depth analysis of this possibility. 3. These tranches would be set by the IMF and could 
be revised periodically to adapt them to the current international economic conditions.
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Figure 1 compares, by way of example, a facility having these features with the current SBA/
EFF facilities (left-hand panel) and with the SRF (right-hand panel). The areas marked with 
oblique lines represent cheaper fi nancing with the single facility or, in other words, an incentive 
to apply to the IMF in such terms as involve a sparing use of resources, in line with its objec-
tives, thereby minimising the risks for both parties and promoting sustainable borrowing that is 
balanced across the various sources of fi nancing. The areas with vertical lines represent a 
relative rise in the cost of resources or an incentive not to use IMF fi nancing on conditions that 
generate risks or diverge from the functions for which the IMF is conceived.
It is important to note that the decline in costs referred to above would not in any event entail a 
relaxation of the requirements for access to IMF credit. The justifi cation required for the granting of 
a loan would of course be just as necessary as at present. Also, the IMF would continue to estab-
lish the terms of the programme, in accordance with its assessment of the borrower’s fi nancing 
needs and repayment capacity. Finally, once the programme were agreed and in effect, purchases 
would continue to be subject to compliance with the conditionality established therein.
The representation of the cost of this hypothetical single facility, which depends on its two 
variables, in three dimensions4 gives rise to a function like the one in the left-hand panel of 
Figure 2. Also, the projection of this function on the lower plane (t,V), on which the axes refl ect 
the programme volume and duration variables, generates a map of indifference curves or 
isocosts, in which the greater the distance from the origin the higher the cost (see right-hand 
panel of Figure 2). This map could be helpful for the decision-taking of a country in diffi culty, 
which would be able to study, a priori, the cost of the different combinations of time and vol-
ume suffi cient to meet its needs. 
The terms on which the IMF considers it appropriate to provide fi nancing would be refl ected 
graphically in the degree of openness of the cup. More stringent conditions, i.e. more expen-
sive fi nancing, would give rise to a more vertical cup and vice versa. Likewise, market fi nancing 
conditions can be represented by another corolla (see Figure 3). In crisis situations, the latter 
would always be contained by the cup of IMF fi nancing since, given its public good nature, the 
IMF will always offer easier terms than the market.
THE SBA/EFF AND SRF FACILITIES COMPARED TO A SINGLE FACILITY FIGURE 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
C C SINGLE FACILITY
SRF
SBA/EFF
rc V rc t
SINGLE FACILITY
4. For the sake of clarity, the function is assumed to be continuous and symmetric, i.e. costs grow in proportion to volume 
and time. 
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Two basic periods are distinguished in IMF credit lines: the arrangement period, which is the 
period during which the country can make purchases up to the total amount granted, and the 
repayment period, i.e. the time within which the loan shall be fully repaid. The arrangement 
period of a single facility like the one described above could be determined in accordance with 
the conditionality associated with each programme, unlike the current arrangement periods, 
which are fi xed for each facility. This option would increase fl exibility.
Likewise, the repayment period could be set by the IMF in each case, in accordance with the 
borrower’s needs and debt sustainability profi le. As for the sequence of repayments, an orien-
tative schedule of repurchases could be established to avoid excessive market reaction in the 
event of failure. Such cases would not constitute default, although the borrower would be re-
quired to justify the delay. This option would have a number of advantages; it would facilitate 
IMF liquidity forecasting and resource rotation; it would provide a date to which expectations 
(both of the country and the markets) regarding the completion of the programme could be 
anchored; it would permit those programmes with accumulated arrears to be identifi ed and it 
would provide an additional incentive, along with those already incorporated in the single facil-
ity (via costs) and other elements of the lending framework (conditionality, preferred creditor 
status, etc.), for the appropriate use of the Fund’s resources. It would not be necessary to 
maintain the distinction between expected and compulsory periods, since the combination of 
the orientative schedule and rising costs over time would be suffi cient to avoid unnecessary 
PERIODS
GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF A SINGLE FACILITY FIGURE 2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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delays in the repurchases. Eliminating this distinction, which is not always well understood, 
would help to simplify the current lending mechanism.
Alternatively, it would be possible, at least in theory, to fi x the repayment deadline only and to 
let the debtor country choose the repurchase sequence. This option would also involve trust-
ing the structure of incentives described above to be suffi cient for the borrower to return the 
amounts drawn down as soon as an improvement in its situation were to enable it to do so. 
This alternative would not give rise to alarm on the markets either, nor would it cast doubt on 
the actions and credibility of the Fund, given the absence of the schedule. Moreover, in the 
event that the programme were not capable of resolving the crisis, the country would have 
more room for manoeuvre to correct the imbalances without the need for a new arrange-
ment.
Figure 4 illustrates two possible examples of how the cost of the single facility would evolve 
over time. In both cases, the total cost of the facility (C) would be obtained by aggregating the 
costs that rise with the duration of the programme (Ct) and those that increase with the volume 
drawn down (CV). For the sake of simplicity, the analysis considers a linear evolution of the use 
of credit, and therefore of the cost associated therewith. The arrangement and repayment 
periods are marked on the x-axis which represents time.
The left-hand panel shows the time profi le of the cost of a programme under a single facility 
granted to address an external imbalance of the type currently covered by an SBA or EFF ar-
rangement. After an initial grace period (marked by the absence of surcharges) C grows in line 
with the time elapsed and the volume drawn down, until the arrangement period ends, when 
the country can no longer make further purchases and, in principle, begins repayment. From 
that point, C diminishes, although not as sharply as CV, owing to the effect of the increase in 
the cost associated with the passage of time, Ct. As already explained, this cost associated 
with the total time elapsed is the distinguishing feature of a single facility with respect to an 
SBA or EFF arrangement and is the main additional incentive for early repayment.
The right-hand panel shows the time profi le of the cost of a single facility when it replaces an 
SRF facility. Unlike in the previous case, C increases in proportion to CV, as a result of the 
EVOLUTION OF COSTS OVER 
TIME
EVOLUTION OVER TIME OF THE COST OF A SINGLE FINANCIAL FACILITY (a) FIGURE 4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Note that the origin does not represent a nil total cost (C = 0), but a total cost equal to the rate of charge 
described In the section entitled «current lending framework» (C = rc).
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frontloading nature of this type of loan. Once market confi dence has been restored and the 
foreseeable repayment period has therefore commenced, C diminishes, although less sharply 
than CV, again due to the effect of the cost associated with the passage of time, Ct. The dis-
tinctive feature of the single facility with respect to an SRF is the penalisation it introduces for 
the use of a large volume of fi nancing in the early stages of the arrangement.
Apart from the incentives incorporated in the fi nancial facilities, the IMF has two important lines 
of defence of its resources: preferred creditor status and programme conditionality. The former, 
implicitly recognised by the international fi nancial community, preserves the Fund from credit 
risk and could effectively strengthen the granting of a single fi nancial facility. The protection of 
the IMF’s resources provided by conditionality is even more solid, as it is not based on a tacit 
multilateral agreement, but on compliance with a set of concrete measures upon which the 
continuity of the credit is conditional. The conditionality of the Fund would be included as an 
integral part of the functioning of a mechanism like the one mentioned above, in the same way 
as in the facilities available now. In support of this argument it should be noted that the struc-
ture of conditionality does not vary according to the type of facility and that its tools (prior ac-
tions, performance criteria, indicative targets, structural benchmarks, etc.) are common to all 
the programmes, although their presence and weight in each varies according to the type of 
crisis involved. Conditionality would, moreover, play a signifi cant role when the length of the 
arrangement period of a single facility is determined.   
As already mentioned, the IMF does not, strictly speaking, grant credit until the country in dif-
fi culty has borrowed beyond its quota. Currently, access to the Fund’s resources is subject to 
an annual limit of 100% and a cumulative limit of 300% of the country’s quota. Credit beyond 
these limits is regulated by the 1983 exceptional circumstances clause and by the 2002 ex-
ceptional access framework, which lay down the criteria that must be fulfi lled to gain access 
to fi nancing beyond these limits. Despite its short life, the framework has been violated on 
various occasions, possibly as a consequence of its excessively rigid design. A facility like the 
one considered in this article would not overcome the limitations of the current framework, but 
neither would it confl ict with it. A single facility, like the current facilities, could channel IMF re-
sources beyond the normal access limits, provided that the country were to comply with the 
criteria mentioned or with such criteria as the IMF may decide to adopt in future. Moreover, its 
introduction would simplify the application of the framework, by not giving rise to a situation 
that varies according to the facility used. The fl exibility of the facility and its cost structure, in 
particular the component that increases according to the volumes drawn down, should not be 
seen as offering a blank cheque to the borrowing country. Rather, these two elements serve 
the lender role attributed to the Fund more effectively.
IMF fi nancial assistance is not only granted to resolve crises, but may also be precautionary. 
Precautionary arrangements are ordinary SBA and EFF arrangements, in which the authori-
ties of the country declare, normally when signing the arrangement, their commitment to 
implement a programme supported by the Fund, with all its associated conditionality, and 
their non-binding intention not to make purchases during the arrangement period. The aim of 
this type of arrangement, like the cases in which it is used, is multifarious, although it nor-
mally has two applications: to cover a possible balance of payments imbalance or to reduce 
the impact of fi nancial decoupling from the IMF. A single fi nancial facility, capable of replacing 
all the Fund’s facilities, could also fulfi l the precautionary role that is sometimes given to SBA 
and EFF facilities and thus satisfy the same objectives at an appropriate cost. A single facility 
streamlining and simplifying the Fund’s lending apparatus could also help improve the com-
munication of precautionary arrangements, which are often not correctly interpreted by third 
parties.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER 
ELEMENTS OF THE IMF’S 
LENDING FRAMEWORK
Preferred creditor status and 
programme conditionality
Exceptional access framework
Precautionary arrangements
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The labelling of a single facility as precautionary would not raise substantial problems in terms 
of cost either. Precautionary granting would not involve any charges as long as the country 
were not to request resources from the Fund. If it were to, the facility would lose its precaution-
ary nature and would be activated with a structure of costs such that they increase with the 
volume drawn down and with the time elapsed from the fi rst drawdown. 
Apart from the use of instruments designed for crisis resolution for precautionary purposes, 
the debate on prevention focuses on the idea of designing and introducing specifi c lines for 
this function. A fi rst attempt was the extinct Contingent Credit Line (CCL). Currently the pos-
sibility is being considered of introducing a new facility known as the Reserve Augmentation 
Line (RAL).
As conceived so far, the objective of the RAL would be to provide requesting countries with an 
insurance mechanism to protect them from a possible unfavourable change in fi nancial condi-
tions. Its most characteristic feature would be the possibility that countries with solid funda-
mentals would be able to obtain the right to make purchases if they were to fulfi l certain pre-
requisites. In other words, the country would comply with ex ante conditionality in order to be 
able to draw down resources immediately, should it need them.
According to this initial conception, the RAL may be considered to have two dimensions. First 
there is the precautionary one, i.e. in the absence of the contingency. This would include the 
pre-qualifi cation criteria, the system to assess compliance with such criteria and the duration 
of the insurance. Second there is the resolution dimension, which would come into play if and 
when the contingency occurred. In this respect, the design of the RAL envisages the defi nition 
of the applicable fi nancial conditions and the level of access to resources. All the features in-
cluded in this second group, which are in principle very similar to the terms of the current SRF, 
would be completely covered by a single facility. In fact, the features of the precautionary di-
mension form an access policy and would therefore be perfectly compatible with a mechanism 
like the one proposed. Before the contingency, a country could be considered to have applied 
for pre-qualifi cation for the single fi nancial facility, or to have gained access to this facility as a 
precautionary measure. From the time purchases are made, the single facility would work as 
described. We might therefore conclude that the single fi nancial facility would replace the 
RAL’s fi nancing components and would be perfectly consistent with an access policy aiming 
to fulfi l the RAL’s insurance objectives.
Exit strategies are basically required because of the perception of countries that it is diffi cult to 
abandon their fi nancial relationship with the IMF and the security it entails without causing 
alarm on the markets. A priori, the infl uence of a single facility on this question would be posi-
tive or neutral. On the one hand, with a single fi nancial facility, the current mechanisms which 
countries can rely on as an exit strategy (basically precautionary arrangements and Post-Pro-
gramme Monitoring (PPM))5 could continue to operate in exactly the same way as at present 
or their role could even be enhanced, to enable them to supervise and monitor the country’s 
performance from the end of the arrangement period until the end of the repayment period. 
Also, a single facility would not interfere with the potential use of the RAL for this purpose, 
depending on its eventual design.
The establishment of a mechanism of this type would also open up new possibilities for bor-
rowers of a trauma-free exit from their fi nancial relationship with the IMF. The greater fl exibility 
Reserve Augmentation Line (RAL)
Exit strategies
5. The purpose of PPM is to provide additional supervision of the country’s performance after the end of the arrangement 
and while the outstanding credit exceeds 100% of the quota.
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for countries provided by the repayment periods of a single fi nancial facility could be used as 
a strategy to smooth their exit in certain cases. 
The LIA policy basically establishes two conditions that should be fulfi lled for the Fund to lend 
to countries in arrears to their private creditors. First, the IMF’s fi nancial assistance should be 
crucial to the success of the country’s adjustment programme and, second, the country should 
be applying appropriate measures and making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative 
agreement with its creditors. This second condition has at least two elements: the country 
must i) maintain a confi dent dialogue with all its creditors from the moment a restructuring is 
deemed to be necessary until it is completed, and ii) share with them all appropriate, relevant 
and non-confi dential information. As in the case of the exceptional access framework referred 
to above, the suitability of the design of the LIA policy is currently subject to debate. However, 
for the purposes of this article, justifi cation of the IMF’s involvement as lender in this type of 
situation is independent of how the fi nancial assistance is given, so that the introduction of a 
mechanism like the one mentioned would not interfere in the LIA policy.
The strategic review being conducted by the IMF and the reform of its mechanism for generat-
ing revenues offer the perfect occasion to re-examine its lending framework and to identify any 
areas that need updating or strengthening.
With the passage of time and the emergence of new types of fi nancial crisis, the IMF’s lending 
mechanism has turned into a complex catalogue of fi nancial facilities with an incentive struc-
ture that could be improved. The IMF’s lending over the last 16 years has, moreover, been 
concentrated in just two fi nancial facilities (SBA and SRF, especially the former), which have 
different cost setting systems (costs depend on the volume drawn down in the case of SBA 
arrangements and time elapsed in that of the SRF).
This article seeks to open a debate on this mechanism and to analyse the possibility of simpli-
fying it, making its operation more fl exible to adapt it to different types of need, increasing its 
potential attractiveness vis-à-vis other fi nancing alternatives and giving it a solid incentive 
structure which promotes a use of resources, both in terms of volume and duration, more in 
line with borrowers’ needs. This latter improvement would attempt to promote fund rotation, 
to stimulate the rapid adoption of corrective measures by debtor countries and to limit the 
potential risk of excessive indebtedness.
For this purpose the article studies the possibility of replacing the current range of fi nancial 
facilities with a single facility, capable of fulfi lling the functions currently attributed to the existing 
instruments and achieving the objectives mentioned above, with the added value of avoiding 
the possibility of undesired arbitrage across the various facilities. The cost of this line, which 
would rise with the volume of credit drawn down and the duration of the programme, would 
reward limited and short-term use of fi nancing and would penalise loans above certain volume 
and duration thresholds that the IMF may consider inappropriate at any given moment.
A credit line like the one described would incorporate ad hoc arrangement and repayment 
periods according to the needs of the programme, which would provide greater fl exibility 
and country ownership in the design of programmes, when adapting the IMF credit to their 
conjunctural situation. It should be stressed that, although a mechanism with these char-
acteristics would tend to reduce the cost of credit in certain circumstances, and to make 
periods more fl exible, its introduction would not entail any relaxation of the requirements for 
access to IMF fi nancing, nor would it weaken the requirement for compliance with condi-
tionality.
Lending into arrears (LIA) policy
Conclusions
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To conclude, without prejudice to a more detailed analysis, a scheme of this nature, besides 
increasing the clarity of the lending framework, offers the possibility of improving the incentives 
for borrower countries and reorientating them towards the achievement of the objectives men-
tioned above. At the same time, the introduction of a single facility would either boost IMF 
lending policies, or at least not come into confl ict with them.
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